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HERPES: A BASIS FOR TORT ACTION IN
CALIFORNIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Genital herpes has emerged from relative obscurity to become a
major public health problem in the United States during the last
decade. It is estimated that twenty million Americans now have geni-
tal herpes and available information indicates that half a million new
genital herpes infections develop yearly.' This disease is incurable,
and treatment is still in a developmental stage.' The National Insti-
tute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases describes genital herpes as a
lifelong, recurrent disease which carries with it not only serious in-
termittent discomfort, but also an intangible burden of anxiety about
future childbirth and cancer. They state, additionally, that it repre-
sents a serious intrusion into normal sexual and marital functions.3
Herpes is caused by two closely related viruses - both of which
may cause genital herpes.4 The outward signs of herpes are blister-
like sores which may itch and burn and be quite painful. The initial
sores may last several weeks before the virus enters a dormant phase
from which it may recur. Herpes is highly infectious when active
lesions are present. The prevailing opinion, however, is that the dis-
ease can be transmitted only by direct contact with infectious cells
© 1984 by Georgia Kloostra Van Zanten
1. Leo, The New Scarlet Letter, TIME, Aug. 2, 1982, at 62. See also U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DIsEAses--1980 STATUS RE-
PORT 233 (1980) (estimating that 15% to 20% of Americans currently suffer from genital
herpes and that 600,000 new cases occur yearly) [hereinafter cited as SEXUALLY TRANSMIT-
TED DIsEASES].
2. See, e.g., Treichel, Acyclovir Counters Recurrent Herpes, 122 Scs. NEws 214 (1982).
In the spring of 1982, the Food and Drug Administration approved acyclovir ointment for the
treatment of herpes. Research indicates that its use reduces new sore formation and shortens
the healing time for patients suffering both the initial and recurrent disease. Id. See also D.
Haupt, Cosmo's Update on Herpes-Paths to a Possible Cure, COSMOPOLITAN Jan. 1983, at
126.
3. SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES, supra note 1, at 233.
4. See R. HAMILTON, THE HERPES BOOK 21 (1980). Traditionally herpes simplex vi-
rus type 1 (HSV-1) caused nearly all cases of herpes found about the mouth and herpes
simplex virus type 2 (HSV-2) caused lesions below the waist. HSV-1 is increasingly being
found as the virus causing genital herpes. As Dr. Richard Hamilton states, "Today, in the so-
called sexual revolution years; the number of cases in which the virus types are cultured from
unexpected sites has jumped to between 10 and 15 percent." Id. at 22.
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which are present in the sores.5
A small number of recently filed cases have focused attention
upon the question of whether a tort cause of action lies against one
who transmits genital herpes to another.' One California case which
was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a cause of action
was reversed by the Second District Court of Appeal.7 The court
indicated that the defendant's tortious conduct in either negligently
or deliberately failing to inform the plaintiff that he was infected
with venereal disease was such as to bring the plaintiff's injury
within the scope of injuries for which the court may provide relief.
It remains to be seen whether the rationale of the Second District
Court of Appeal will prevail in California.
Although the common law recognized a cause of action against
one who infected another with a contagious disease,9 suits have
rarely been brought when the contagious disease was a sexually
transmitted one. A plaintiff was most likely reluctant to bring a suit
which would focus public attention upon his contraction of a vene-
real disease. Furthermore, a plaintiff historically encountered the
doctrines of spousal immunity, contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk which operated to bar his recovery.
These doctrines have been abrogated in California and this
comment will analyze whether the California courts should recognize
a cause of action based upon the transmission of genital herpes.10
5. Id. at 8-9. See also AM. SOCIAL HEALTH ASS'N, Some Questions and Answers About
Herpes (1983) [hereinafter cited as Questions and Answers]. But cf. SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED
DIS.ASES, supra note 1, at 139 (suggesting that research is necessary to determine whether an
infected but asymptomatic sex partner is as likely to transmit HSV-2 as is a person with overt
genital disease); Leo, supra note 1, at 66 (acknowledging that two U.C.L.A. researchers re-
ported that the herpes virus can live on towels and toilet seats for a period of time).
6. Liptrot v. Basini, No. 82-19427 (Broward County Ct., Fla., filed Sept. 20, 1982)
alleges that the defendant transmitted genital herpes to the plaintiff after assuring her that he
did not have a communicable disease. See Mintz, Herpes Suit Complex, But Not Without
Virtue, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 12; Mellowitz and Rojas, Herpes: A Causefor Legal
Action?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 8, 1982, at 3. St. Clair v. St. Clair, No. 82-1 105-CV-W-6 (D. Mo.
filed Dec. 27, 1982) alleges that the defendant husband infected his wife with genital herpes.
See New Case of Herpes: Banker Sued by Wife, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 10, 1983, at 2.
7. In Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal Rptr. 273 (1984), the
court reversed the trial court's dismissal of a cause of action based upon negligence, battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud. The complaint alleged that the defendant
had inflicted injury upon the plaintiff by having sexual intercourse with her at a time when he
knew or should have known that he was a carrier of venereal disease.
8. Id.
9. 39 AM. JUR. 2d Health § 48 (1968).
10. Although facial herpes lesions may be the source of an infection of genital herpes, it
is not the purpose of this comment to analyze resulting liability for such transmission. The
discussion herein is limited to a defendant who has an outbreak of genital herpes which he
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Although the facts and circumstances of each individual case will be
determinative of the action to be brought, possible actions include
negligence, assault and battery, misrepresentation, loss of consor-
tium, and the infliction of emotional distress.
II. HISTORICAL BASIS OF AN ACTION FOR THE INFLICTION OF
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE
An English court originally indicted a mother for carrying her
child who was infected with smallpox along a public highway. The
court noted that no person with such a disease should be exposed so
as to endanger the health and lives of the King's subjects."' This
rationale has been expanded to provide for civil liability, and the
general principle has been established that a person who negligently
exposes another to an infectious disease, which the other thereby
contracts, is liable for damages.1 In order to show such negligence,
it was traditionally necessary to prove that the defendant knew of the
presence of the disease." Where this requirement was met, liability
has been imposed upon defendants who exposed others to whooping
cough, typhoid fever, smallpox, and tuberculosis."'
Genital herpes, syphilis and gonnorhea are infectious and con-
tagious." Additionally, they share the stigma of being a disease
which is sexually transmitted. Although genital herpes has only re-
cently become a major source of public health concern, syphilis and
gonnorhea have plagued mankind for centuries.
The law has recognized the detrimental effect of being accused
of having a venereal disease. 6 The imputation that a person has a
transfers to a plaintiff through sexual activity involving genital contacts.
The use of the pronoun "he" is not meant to connote gender, but is used generally.
11. A discussion of this case, King v. Vantandillo, 105 Eng. Rep. 762, 4 Maule & S. 73,
may be found in Hurst v. Warner, 47 Am. St. Rep. 525 at 550 (1894).
12. See 39 Am. JUR. 2D, supra note 9, at § 48.
13. Id.
14. See Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953) (reversed dismissal of a
suit brought against a tubercular landlord by a tenant who contracted tuberculosis); Hendricks
v. Butcher, 144 Mo. App. 671, 129 S.W. 431 (1910) (held that one who is inflicted with
smallpox owes a duty to everyone to conduct himself so as not to communicate the disease);
Kliegel v. Aitken, 94 Wis. 432, 69 N.W. 67 (1896) (affirmed judgment against defendant who
failed to disclose that his daughter was ill with typhoid fever when employing plaintiff to care
for the child); Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (1884) (liability imposed upon a defendant who took
his children, when they had whooping cough, to a boarding school thereby exposing others to
the disease).
15. An infectious disease is one caused by the entrance, growth and multiplication of
micro-organisms in the body. A contagious disease is one transmitted from one person to an-
other by mediate or immediate contact. Earle v. Kuklo, 98 A.2d 197 at 108 (1953).
16. "[Silander may be committed by an imputation of the present existence of an infec-
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loathsome disease is actionable even without proof of actual dam-
ages. 7 If recovery is deemed just in an action for defamation when
one imputes that another has a venereal disease, it seems to follow
that the law would readily recognize an action for damages against a
party who actually caused another to contract such a disease. Few
cases, however, have dealt with the transmission of venereal
disease. 8
III. TRADITIONAL BARRIERS TO BRINGING SUIT BASED UPON
THE CONTRACTION OF A SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASE AND
THE ABROGATION OF SUCH BARRIERS IN CALIFORNIA
Originally, several doctrines imposed nearly insurmountable
barriers upon the bringing of a tort action by one who contracted a
sexually transmitted disease from another. These barriers have been
severely eroded, if not destroyed, in California, and the possibility of
successfully maintaining such an action has been significantly im-
proved. The contraction of a sexually transmitted disease has been
traditionally associated with immorality and incurability. Ostracism
from the community was a real possibility for those who admitted
having such a disease, 1' and suffering in silence may well have been
the easier cross to bear. Furthermore, in the forties, penicillin and
related antibiotics emerged to treat syphilis and gonorrhea and thus
reduced the incentive to bring suit. Genital herpes, however, remains
incurable.
A. Social Values
The birth control pill spawned a sexual revolution in America
in the sixties. The California legislature has endorsed the view that
consensual sexual activity between adults should not be subject to
penal sanctions and has deleted from the penal code statutes forbid-
ding fornication, adultery, and homosexual practices except as they
tious, contagious, or loathsome disease . . .[and] a false ... communication . . . that [a]
plaintiff is afflicted with syphilis constitutes slander per se." 6 CAL. Jun. 3d Assault and
Other Wilful Torts § 156 (1973).
17. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 754 (4th ed. 1971).
18. See Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (1979) (plaintiff who contracted gonorrhea from
defendant barred from recovery because the statute of limitations had run); De Vail v. Strunk,
96 S.W. 2d 245 (1936) (reversed dismissal of cause of action for the infliction of "crabs" based
upon misrepresenation); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920) (upheld suit
for damages by wife who contracted venereal disease from her husband); State v. Lankford, 29
Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 102 A. 63 (1917) (affirmed conviction of husband who infected his wife
with syphilis).
19. See W. PRosSa, supra note 17, at 756-57.
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relate to a lack of consent or capacity to consent.' 0 Although accept-
ance of such practices is not universal, the legislature's action indi-
cates that a large number of California citizens no longer believe that
such activities should be subject to legal condemnation. In conjunc-
tion with a growing permissiveness regarding sexual relationships,
society's disapprobation of those who contract venereal disease has
lessened. An atmosphere which is conducive to bringing an action
based upon the contraction of a sexually transmitted disease, such as
genital herpes, is more prevalent in California than in most other
states."1
B. Spousal Immunity
The common law barred suits of one spouse against the other.' 2
Although states recognized that the infection of a wife with a vene-
real disease by her husband was tortious, those applying the common
law rule held that a wife could not sue for such a tort upon her
person."3
Originally, the California courts followed the common law and
refused to allow a tort action to be maintained between a husband
and wife.' In 1962 the California Supreme Court abandoned the
rule of interspousal immunity for both intentional and negligent per-
sonal torts 5 thus eliminating the absolute bar to such actions against
a spouse.
C. Contributory Negligence
At common law, if a plaintiff was found to be contributorily
negligent, he was denied recovery unless the defendant had the last
20. See Comment, California "Consenting Adults" Law: The Sex Act in Perspective, 13
SAN DiEo L. REV. 439 (1976).
21. An example of the resources available in California is the Herpes Resource Center,
located in Palo Alto, which has over 26,000 nationwide members. The center organizes local
support groups and provides telephone information and counseling and referral services. It also
furnishes members with the opportunity to participate in research and educational projects,
political action and fundraising drives for expanded scientific investigation.
22. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 859-63.
23. E.g., Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 P. 629 (1911).
24. With the passage of the women's emancipation acts, most courts allowed one spouse
to recover against the other for a tort committed against property, but the California Supreme
Court still refused to extend such a right to the field of personal torts. See Peters v. Peters, 156
Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909).
25. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (abandoned
the rule of spousal immunity for negligent personal torts); Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376
P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (abrogation of the doctine of interspousal immunity for
intentional torts).
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clear chance to avoid the injury." Contributory negligence is conduct
on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard of care he
is required to exercise for his own protection." It is likely that a
reasonable person would realize that his chance of contracting vene-
real disease would be significantly increased if he engaged in sexual
intercourse outside a marital relationship. His conduct in doing so
would thus be tantamount to contributory negligence and he would
be denied a remedy for any resultant injury.
In addition, contributory negligence could easily be established
through the use of fornication and adultery statutes, widely in effect
for many years, which prohibited persons from engaging in sexual
relations without benefit of marriage.2 Evidence of a violation of a
statute was treated in various ways by different states. 9 But regard-
less of the violation's evidentiary effect, in the case of venereal dis-
ease the illicit sexual act in which a plaintiff participated was likely
to result in a finding of contributory negligence and thus a bar to
recovery.
In a sweeping change of California negligence law, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab80 abrogated the doctrine of
contributory negligence. In its place the court adopted a system of
comparative negligence in its "pure" form. The court stated that "in
all actions for negligence . . . the contributory negligence of the per-
son injured . . .[should] not bar recovery, but the damages awarded
[should] be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence at-
tributable to the person recovering."
If a plaintiff contracts genital herpes and is found to be negli-
gent in engaging in the sexual act which placed his health at risk, his
negligence should no longer bar his recovery. Rather, the jury would
need to determine the percentage of fault attributable to each party
and deny the plaintiff recovery for only those damages to which his
negligence contributed. The California Supreme Court's adoption of
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1965). It appears that if the defendant
knew he had a venereal disease and the plaintiff was unaware of such fact, the defendant had
the last clear chance to avoid sexual contact likely to result in injury to the plaintiff. However,
in the past the courts may have been unwilling to apply this doctrine where a plaintiff's con-
duct was perceived to be immoral and against the interest of the community in protecting and
strengthening the family relationship.
27. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 416-17.
28. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
29. A violation of a statute may result in a finding of negligence per se, a rebuttable
presumption of negligence or mere evidence of negligence. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at
200-01.
30. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
31. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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comparative negligence has opened the door to suits where a plain-
tiff's conduct is a substantial factor in the cause of his injury.
D. Assumption of the Risk
The doctrine of assumption of the risk also frustrated pursuance
of a suit by a plaintiff who contracted a venereal disease. Tradition-
ally, assumption of the risk required a subjective finding that the
plaintiff had actual knowledge of the specific risk, comprehended the
magnitude of the danger, and voluntarily encountered it.' Many
courts, however, adopted a more objective standard and denied the
plaintiff's assertions of ignorance when the risk should have been
quite clear and obvious.' 8 More than likely, the risk of contracting
venereal disease in a non-marital sexual encounter was, or should
have been, within the knowledge of the plaintiff, and the fact that he
voluntarily encountered such a risk would relieve the defendant of aduty of reasonable conduct toward the plaintiff, who could not subse-
quently recover damages.
In Li, the California Supreme Court also addressed the status of
assumption of the risk. The court distinguished between a reasonable
and unreasonable assumption of the risk and held that where aplaintiff unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific known risk
posed by the negligent conduct of a defendant, such conduct is a form
of contributory negligence and is merged into the general assessment
of liability in proportion to fault." In Gonzalez v. Garcia," the Sec-
ond District Appellate Court expanded upon the definition of "un-
reasonable". It found that where there is a reasonably safe alterna-
tive open, the plaintiff's free choice of the more dangerous way is
unreasonable and is thus merged into the doctrine of comparative
negligence.'6
There is a reasonably safe alternative to placing oneself in aposition wherein one would be likely to contract genital herpes. As
the herpes virus is transmittable only when lesions are present, in
order to avoid contracting the disease one must avoid sexual activity
with a partner who has an active outbreak of the disease.87 To fail to
32. Vierra v. Fifth Avenue Rental Serv., 60 Cal. 2d 266, 270-71, 383 P.2d 777, 780, 32
Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (1963).
33. See W. PRossER, supra note 17, at 448.
34. 13 Cal. 3d at 826, 532 P.2d at 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
35. 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1977).
36. Id. at 881, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
37. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 25. Dr. Hamilton describes an active outbreak
as beginning with the prodrome (a period shortly before the sores appear, characterized by an
1984]
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ascertain whether one's anticipated sexual partner has a contagious
outbreak of genital herpes, or to engage in sexual activity knowing
the other is infectious, is an unreasonable assumption of the risk and
thus a form of contributory negligence which must be assessed in
determining comparative fault.
The Li court indicated that a reasonable assumption of the risk
would bar an action. The Gonzalez court, in finding an unreasona-
ble assumption of the risk, pointed out that there was no waiver of
duty, agreement, or other element present in the case which was not
a variant of contributory negligence. 8 This suggests that such ele-
ments would bar suit. It appears, therefore, that if a party knows
that another has an active outbreak of genital herpes, understands
the risk of engaging in sexual activity under such circumstances, and
agrees to relieve his sexual partner of responsibility regarding the
transmission of the disease, that party could not subsequently insti-
tute an action under California law.
IV. CALIFORNIA TORT ACTIONS AVAILABLE FOR THE
CONTRACTION OF GENITAL HERPES
Except where a plaintiff waives the defendant's duty to exercise
due care, he may now bring several tort actions based upon the con-
traction of genital herpes from another. The determination of which
causes of action should be alleged will be dependent upon the facts
and circumstances of each case.
A. Negligence: The Breaching of a Duty to Abstain from Sexual
Activity When One has a Contagious Outbreak of Genital Herpes
Section 1714 of the California Civil Code provides that
"[e]veryone is responsible. . . for an injury occasioned to another by
his want of ordinary care ... in the management of his ... person.
."" The courts have, however, found exceptions to this codifica-
tion of negligence, and as the court stated in Richard P. v. Vista Del
Mar Child Care Services, ° "[TIhe real basis of negligence is not
carelessness, but behavior which society . . . views as involving un-
reasonable risk of harm to others."'41 Liability is imposed only if the
gravity and likelihood of the danger outweigh the utility of the con-
itchy, tingling feeling) and lasting until the sores are completely healed. Id. at 89-91.
38. 75 Cal. App. 3d at 881, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
39. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1983).
40. 106 Cal. App. 3d 860, 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, (1980).
41. Id. at 866, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
[Vol. 24
19841 HERPES
duct involved.42 The California courts have, nevertheless, increas-
ingly found a duty on the part of defendants to exercise due care. 48
The courts have based the imposition of liability on both common
law and statutory principles."
1. Common Law Principles
Applying common law principles, the California Supreme
Court in Rowland v. Christian45 stated that an exception should not
be made to the general principle stated in Civil Code section 1714
unless such a finding was clearly supported by public policy.4' The
Rowland court outlined considerations which must be balanced
before departing from the principle of holding a defendant liable for
the injury he occasioned to a plaintiff.' 7
a. Foreseeability of the Risk
In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.," the California Supreme
Court indicated that of the several factors enumerated by the Row-
42. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 47, 539 P.2d 36, 40 123 Cal. Rptr.
468, 472 (1975).
43. See Comment, The Death of Palsgraf: A Comment on the Current Status of the
Duty Concept in California, 16 SAN DiEo L. Rav. 793 (1979) (concluding that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has brought about a sweeping re-evaluation of tort law resulting in a
system which is pro-plaintiff and pro-recovery) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Death of
Palsgraj]. See also Levy & Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the Crossroads, 67 CAUiF. L.
REv. 497 (1979) (arguing that the court is continuing to expand the incidence of tort liability).
44. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534 (1978).
45. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
46. Id. at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. The courts have invoked public
policy considerations in denying a plaintiff a remedy when the protection of institutions was
deemed more important than the plaintiff's right to a recovery. See comment, The Death of
Palsgraf, supra note 40, at 807-08. See also Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv.,
106 Cal. App. 3d 860, 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1980) (affirmed dismissal of action against an
adoption agency which placed a child who later developed emotional and developmental
problems); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976) (affirmed dismissal of suit brought against school district for the alleged
failure to educate the plaintiff).
47. 69 Cal. 2d at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. The court stated:
A departure from this fundamental principle involves the balancing of a number
of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm,
the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id.
48. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
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land court, the primary consideration was that of the foreseeability
of the risk.49 Herpes is a highly infectious disease when it is in an
active phase. Upon contact with tissue the virus easily penetrates the
surface cells and becomes established. 0 Consequently, a person who
engages in sexual relations during an active outbreak of genital
herpes runs a substantial and foreseeable risk of transmitting the dis-
ease to his sexual partner."1
Likewise, one who transmits genital herpes to another could
reasonably anticipate that such party would subsequently infect a
third party. The California courts have addressed the issue of a su-
perseding intervening cause as a "problem [relevant in determining]
the duty of the defendant to protect the person injured against the
particular intervening cause." s
In the absence of a special relationship between the parties, the
common law imposed no duty upon a defendant to control the con-
duct of a third person so as to prevent him from causing harm to
another.58 Courts have indicated that a defendant is entitled to as-
sume that others will not act negligently."
The Weirum court, nevertheless, held that a defendant could be
held liable "[i]f the likelihood that a third person may react in a
particular manner is a hazard which makes the actor negligent, such
reaction . . . does not prevent the actor from being liable for the
harm caused thereby." 5 A party who contracts genital herpes from a
defendant and subsequently transmits it to a third party is not react-
ing to the defendant's initial negligence, but is, rather, engaging in
49. Id. at 46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
50. R. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 5. Even if a condom is used, the risk of transmis-
sion is considerable. As the virus is smaller than the pores of a condom, it may pass through
and infect the other party. Id. at 93. Furthermore, the lesions may not be confined to the
immediate area protected by a condom and the chance of contacting infectious cells remains
high.
51. The common law required that a defendant know that he was infected with a dis-
ease before imposing liability upon him for the transmission of the disease. The adoption of
comparative negligence, however, should preclude the necessity of such a finding. Whether a
defendant knew or should have known that his diesease was contagious is an element to be
considered in apportioning fault. Dr. Hamilton states that generally the infection is easily
recognizable and only in rare cases is it undetectable. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 90-
91.
52. Premo v. Grigg, 237 Cal. App. 2d 192, 195, 46 Cal. Rptr. 683, 686 (1965).
53. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976).
54. 237 Cal. App. 2d at 195, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 686 (stating that "when a third person
becomes aware of danger, or should, if he acted reasonably, be aware of it, a defendant has a
right to assume that he will act reasonably and will not be held liable for the intervening act").
55. 15 Cal. 3d at 47, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (emphasis added).
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autonomously negligent conduct. Such conduct should operate to
break the chain of causation and leave the defendant owing a duty
only to plaintiffs who directly contract the disease from him,"' with
the possible exception that he would remain liable to the known
spouse of a sexual partner.5s
b. Certainty of Injury
The Rowland court required that courts analyze the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury. Although it might be
suggested that genital herpes is nothing more than cold sores in the
wrong place," the weight of authority is to the contrary. The ulcer-
ations which are symptomatic of genital herpes may be painful, pro-
longed, and subject to frequent recurrence. The psychosexual disrup-
tion that accompanies genital herpes may be associated with lifelong
alterations in social and sexual behavior and may result in severe
depression."
Women are subject to additional concerns. Those infected with
genital herpes are at least six times more likely to develop cervical
cancer than the general female population." Pregnant women who
develop genital herpes are two to three times more likely to suffer
spontaneous abortions or premature delivery, and infants who con-
tract the virus during delivery have a mortality rate of sixty-five per-
cent. One half of those who survive suffer from mental retardation
and/or blindness." Although genital herpes is rarely fatal to
adults," it may have a devastating effect upon their physical, social,
and mental well-being.
Courts are further directed by the Rowland decision to establish
the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury suffered. Dr. Richard Hamilton, a specialist in the treat-
56. Although liability for the contraction of genital herpes should be imposed upon a
defendant only in regard to a plaintiff who directly contracts the disease from him, a defendant
may also owe a duty to a plaintiff's spouse for loss of consortium or infliction of emotional
distress. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
58. See Leo, supra note 1, at 65.
59. See SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DIsEAsEs, supra note 1, at 135.
60. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 112.
61. See SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEAsES, supra note 1, at 136.
62. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 10-11. As herpes is highly infectious, it is easily
spread by autoinoculation. If transferred to the face, in a small number of cases it may travel
to the brain and result in herpes encephalitis-a potentially fatal disease. See id. at 119-23.
Additionally a common problem complicating kidney transplants is that antirejection treatment
reactivates the herpes virus. Unopposed by immune factors, the virus is able to become a rap-
idly escalating general infection which may prove fatal. See id. at 124-26.
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ment of sexual disorders, states that "[slince the virus is transmissi-
ble only when lesions are present, those wishing not to spread
[herpes] need only curtail direct contact during times of active out-
breaks." 68 If a defendant fails to curtail such contact and the plaintiff
thereby contracts the disease, the defendant's conduct is directly con-
nected with the plaintiff's injury.
Such conduct on the part of the defendant is also morally
blameworthy. There is a right of all people to be secure in their
health and safety," ' and a defendant who transmits genital herpes to
another has acted in a manner indicating a reckless disregard of the
rights of another. His conduct should be viewed by the courts as
being morally reprehensible.
c. Community Considerations
Courts should also look at the policy of preventing future harm.
Genital herpes is epidemic and, in order to prevent further spread
of the disease, infected parties must be discouraged from engaging in
conduct which results in its transmission. The recognition of a legal
duty to abstain from sexual activity during an active outbreak of
genital herpes and resultant liablity for breach of such duty would
undoubtedly "chill" such conduct. Not to recognize such a duty
would have the opposite effect. As Justice Garst noted in Harris v.
Trojan Fireworks," "[W]hen one is rendered immune from the nat-
ural and foreseeable consequence of his conduct, a substantial incen-
tive to act in a responsible manner is removed. ''" 7 It is imperative,
therefore, that the courts impose a duty upon one who has a conta-
gious outbreak of genital herpes to act in a responsible manner so as
to not cause injury to another.
The courts should also balance the extent of the burden to the
defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise due care. Although abstention from sexual activity
during an outbreak of genital herpes is not an insubstantial burden
63. Id. at 9. See supra note 35. The American Social Health Association suggests a
similar rule. They state that "[w]hen any sign of recurrence is noticed-itching, burning, tin-
gling, or sores-one should prevent the affected area from coming in contact with another
person." See Questions and Answers, supra note 5.
64. See Harris v. Trojan Fireworks, 120 Cal. App. 3d 157, 170, 174 Cal. Rptr. 452,
457 (1981) (Garst, J., concurring).
65. Dr. Hamilton states that "[slince each new person with recurrent herpes is able to
infect any number of others, the unchecked epidemic will grow in a geometric fashion, contin-
ually broadening its base and growing ever more rapidly." R. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 25.
66. 120 Cal. App. 3d 157, 174 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1981).
67. Id. at 177, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 464 (Garst, J.,concurring).
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to a defendant, the benefit to the community in protecting and pre-
serving the health and safety of its citizens far outweighs the burden
imposed upon a contagious defendant.
The recognition of a cause of action based upon the transmis-
sion of genital herpes might result in a burden to the community in
that the courts will be inundated by a flood of litigation. However,
this is not likely to result for several reasons. It is suggested that
liability be delimited so as to impose a duty upon the defendant only
in regard to those plaintiffs who directly contract the disease from
him. Furthermore, there will remain a great deal of personal reti-
cence on the part of plaintiffs to bring suits whereby the most inti-
mate details of their private lives would be subjected to public scru-
tiny. Likewise, the difficulty of proving the allegation is another
factor which will substantially curtail any possible flood of
litigation. 68
The recognition of a cause of action based on the negligent in-
fliction of genital herpes also carries with it the possibility of abuse
and the potentiality of fraudulent claims. The California Supreme
Court addressed this issue in Dillon v. Legg and emphasized that
compensation should not be denied to those who have actually suf-
fered serious injury through the negligence of another merely be-
cause of the possibility of encouraging fictitious claims.70 It was
noted that courts have a basic responsibility to decide the merits of
each individual case, rather than to sweep away a class of cases "us-
ing the broad broom of 'administrative convenience'. . . .""1The last
factor suggested by the Rowland court is the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance. The California Supreme Court in Coulter
v. Superior Court7U seemingly dismissed the importance of this con-
sideration in a passing remark. The court noted that insurance cov-
erage, although increasingly costly, would doubtlessly be made avail-
able by insurance companies to protect defendants upon whom
liability was imposed." Likewise, insurance may be made available
for herpes sufferers if liability is imposed upon those who transmit
68. By its very nature, the transmission of genital herpes does not often lend itself to
eyewitness accounts. A plaintiff who has had a number of sexual partners may find it difficult
to convince a jury that he is suffering from an initial contraction of the disease and not a
recurrence. A sexually promiscuous plaintiff will find it difficult to show that a particular
defendant was the party who infected him with genital herpes.
69. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
70. Id. at 736, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
71. Id. at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
72. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
73. Id. at 153, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
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genital herpes.
The answer to the criteria enunciated in Rowland indicates that
an exception should not be made to the expression of public policy
favoring compensation to victims of negligent acts found in section
1714 of the California Civil Code. An analysis of additional Califor-
nia statutes provides a further basis for imposing liability upon a
defendant who infects another with genital herpes.
2. Statutory Support
A presumption of negligence arises in California when a statute
is violated." Section 3353 of the Health and Safety Code provides
that "any persons afflicted with any contagious, infectious, or com-
municable disease who wilfully exposes himself [to another] ...is
guilty of a misdemeanor." '75 Since genital herpes is contagious, infec-
tious, and communicable, a defendant who engages in sexual activity
during an active outbreak of the disease exposes himself to another.
The statute requires, however, that such exposure be wilful.
Wilful misconduct in civil actions traditionally required that a defen-
dant have actual or constructive knowledge of both the danger to be
apprehended and the probability that such peril would result in in-
jury. He must have then failed to act in a manner so as to avoid the
danger." It would appear that a defendant with an infectious out-
break of genital herpes would have at least constructive knowledge
of the peril involved as well as knowledge of the high probability
that sexual activity would result in the transmission of the disease.
In disregarding this knowledge and persisting in sexual conduct, his
action would be wilful.
A violation of section 3353 can directly result in a plaintiff con-
tracting herpes. The transmission of this contagious disease is exactly
the type of injury which the statute was designed to prevent as the
section comes under the heading of Communicable Disease Preven-
tion. Furthermore, a person suffering the injury is a member of the
class which the statute was adopted to protect as the primary pur-
74. Section 669 of the California Evidence Code provides: "The failure of a person to
exercise due care is presumed if ...[hie violated a statute ...; [t]he violation proximately
causeld] ...[an] injury ...which the statute ...was designed to prevent; and ... [t]he
person suffering . . . the injury ...was one of the class of persons for whose protection the
statute ...was adopted." CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (West Supp. 1983). See Holdych, The
Presumption of Negligence Rule in California: The Common Law and Evidence Code Section
669, 11 PAC. L.J. 907 (1980).
75. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3353 (West 1979) (emphasis added).




pose of the Health and Safety Code is "the preservation of the public
health and safety, including the health and safety of persons
. . ."" It appears, therefore, that both common law principles and
section 3353 indicate that a duty should be imposed upon a defen-
dant to abstain from sexual contact with another when he has a con-
tagious outbreak of genital herpes.""
B. Assault and Battery: An Offensive Touching Absent Effective
Consent
A cause of action for the contraction of genital herpes may also
lie in battery. A civil battery action may be brought upon a showing
that the defendant acted with wanton, wilful, or reckless disregard of
a plaintiff's rights.79 Courts have recognized, however, that intent is
the essential element of the offense when the offensive touching oc-
curs in the course of an otherwise lawful act. " When a party actu-
ally intends to transmit genital herpes to another, he commits a bat-
tery upon that person."
Intent may also be inferred in that every person is presumed to
intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts." The Del-
aware appellate court in State v. Lankford,83 finding a completed
battery, stated that if the "accused knew he was infected with
syphilis, and his infection was unknown to his wife, the intent to
communicate the disease to her by having sexual intercourse ...
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE preamble (West 1979).
78. The California legislature has indicated a specific concern regarding the transmis-
sion of venereal disease. Section 3198 of the Health and Safety Code provides that any person
who "exposes any person or infects any person with any veneracal disease; or any person
infected with a venereal disease in an infectious state who knows of such a condition and who.
. has sexual intercourse, is guilty of a misdmeanor." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3198
(West 1979). Technically, genital herpes is a form of venereal disease and the term is being
replaced by the more accurate one of "sexually transmissible disease." See R. HAMILTON,
supra note 4, at 184. On its face, section 3198 would appear to raise a presumption of negli-
gence on the part of a defendant who infected another with genital herpes.
Herpes, however, did not become a source of public health concern until 1965. See R.
HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 26. In 1957 the legislature defined venereal disease. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3001 (West 1979). Although the definition does not include geni-
tal herpes, the fact that herpes was not a health concern at the time the statute was passed
indicates that the legislature did not specifically intend to exclude it from the definition. There-
fore, the broader § 3353 should apply with additional force since there is evidence of legislative
intent to halt the spread of sexually transmittable diseases.
79. Lopez v. Surchia, 112 Cal. App. 2d 314, 318, 246 P.2d 111, 113 (1952).
80. Id.
81. See Leo, supra note 1, at 64 (indicating that persons may actively seek to transmit
the disease).
82. See 112 Cal. App. 2d 314, 318, 246 P.2d 111, 113 (1952).
83. 29 Del. 594, 103 A. 63 (1917).
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may be inferred from the actual results.""
Consent is a defense to an allegation of battery, and a defendant
may argue that the plaintiff consented to the sexual intercourse
which constituted the touching. However, where the plaintiff did not
have knowledge of the defendant's infectious state, it does not follow
that in consenting to intercourse the plaintiff also consented to being
infected with genital herpes."'
When a defendant has an active outbreak of herpes, the
probability that he will transmit the disease is extremely high. The
inherent risk involved in the sex act under such circumstances must
be made known to potential partners in order that they may make an
informed decision as to whether they shall proceed in sexual rela-
tions with the defendant. If the defendant fails to divulge this risk,
he has failed to obtain effective consent and is liable in battery.
C. Fraudulent Deceit: A Wilful Deception
If the elements of fraud can be maintained, an action may be
brought for deceit."' Section 1709 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that "[olne who willfully deceives another with intent to induce
him to alter his position to his injury or risk is liable for any damage
which he thereby suffers." '87
One who enters into a sexual relationship knowing, and with-
out disclosing, that he has a contagious outbreak of genital herpes,
deceives the other person and seeks through his silence to induce the
other to place himself in a position involving the risk of injury. The
law requires disclosure of information when the parties are in a con-
fidential relationship. 88 Such a legal relationship exists between a
84. Id. at 596, 103 A. at 64.
85. Prosser, in illustrating effective consent, states that a plaintiff who willingly engages
in a boxing match consents to a defendant striking him; however, he does not consent to being
hit with brass knuckles which is the same invasion by an act of a different character. See W.
PROSSE t, supra note 17, at 103.
86. See generally 34 CAL. JUR. 3d Fraud and Deceit § 4 (1977).
[Tio establish a cause of action for fraud or deceit based on misrepresentation
. . . the plaintiff must show that the representation was as to a material fact;
that it was false and known to be false by the party making it or else made
recklessly, or without reasonable grounds for believing its truth; that the repre-
sentation was made with [the] intent to induce the other party to do or refrain
from doing . . . some act; that it was relied upon by the other party, . . . [who]
was ignorant of the falsity of the representation and reasonably believed it to be
true; and that he thereby suffered . . . injury.
Id. at § 6.
87. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1709 (West 1973).
88. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710 (West 1973). Section 1710 provides that deceit may be
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husband and wife, but not between parties who have no other special
relationship.89 Silence, therefore, may support an allegation of fraud-
ulent concealment in cases involving spouses, but not where a mari-
tal relationship does not exist.90
Where a person untruthfully and affirmatively assures another
that he does not have a contagious outbreak of genital herpes, a more
classic case of misrepresentation may arise. A person who has an
infectious case of genital herpes is unlikely to have any grounds to
believe that he is free of contagious infection due to the character of
the disease.91 Furthermore, courts will most likely find that knowl-
edge of the existence of contagious genital herpes in another is a
material fact in determining whether one will engage in sexual rela-
tions. If the plaintiff can establish that he relied upon an affirmative
misrepresentation and thereby suffered injury, the defendant should
be found liable for fraudulent deceit. 9"
"[tihe suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it . Id. (emphasis added). See
34 CAL. JUR. 3d Fraud and Deceit § 27 (1977) (enumerating examples of relationships giving
rise to such a duty).
89. Id.
90. Prosser states that "there has been a rather amorphous tendency on the part of most
courts to find a duty of disclosure in cases where the defendant has special knowledge. . . not
[available] to the plaintiff . . . ." W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 697. In a case of genital
herpes, however, an inspection of a partner's genitals would generally reveal the presence of
infection.
91. See supra note 51.
92. In Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980), the
court refused to impose liability for misrepresentation upon an unwed mother who had falsely
represented to the child's father that she was taking birth control pills. The court held that "as
a matter of public policy the practice of birth control ... is best left to the individuals involved,
free from any governmental interference." Id. at 645, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 621 (emphasis added).
The court appears to rely upon the fact that birth of a child is the natural result of consensual
sexual intercourse and it also recognized that requiring the mother to pay monetary damages
may have the effect of reducing her financial ability to suppport the child. Id. at 643, 164 Cal.
Rptr. at 619.
The Roni holding should be limited to cases regarding a misrepresentation as to contra-
ceptive measures taken. The public policy issues supporting this holding are not applicable to
cases where a defendant transfers genital herpes to a plaintiff. The contraction of an incurable
disease is not the natural result of sexual activity. Furthermore, the potential detrimental ef-
fects to an innocent third party of imposing liability upon the defendant are not present.
The court in Kathleen K. v. Robert B., in reversing a lower court decision dismissing a
cause of action based on the transmission of genital herpes, stated that public policy considera-
tions regarding parental obligations were absent from such a case and thus dismissed the Roni
rationale. The court in a unanimous opinion stated that "[t]he right of privacy is not absolute,
and in some cases is subordinate to the state's fundamental right to enact laws which promote
public health, welfare, and safety, even though such laws may invade the offender's right of
privacy." 150 Cal. App 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). See supra note 7.
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D. Loss of Consortium: A Spouse's Right to Protection of the Mari-
tal Relationship
In Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,"s the California Su-
preme Court held that a spouse has a cause of action for loss of
consortium against a defendant who negligently or intentionally in-
jured the other spouse. Using a foreseeability analysis, it found that
one who negligently injures an adult should statistically expect that
the injured person is married and thus foresee that a spouse will be
adversely affected by the injury." This element of marital foresee-
ability, however, does not carry over to the population engaging in
sexual relations with parties to whom they are not married and the
likelihood that such parties are single is substantial. It is thus unrea-
sonable to impose liability for loss of consortium upon a defendant
who does not know that his sexual partner is married. However,
where there is knowledge of a marital relationship, a defendant
should reasonably anticipate resulting harm to the spouse and should
be held liable to that party.
The court in Molien v. Kaiser" found that either physical in-
jury or an impairment of a spouse's mental health could result in the
loss of companionship, affection, and sexual enjoyment. Injury to a
spouse, however, must be sufficiently serious and disabling to raise
the inference that the conjugal relationship is more than superficially
or temporarily impaired."
Genital herpes is an incurable, lifelong disease, subject to un-
predictable recurrence. It is, furthermore, necessary to refrain from
engaging in sexual activity during all periods of active outbreak to
insure against transmitting the disease to one's spouse. A total depri-
vation of a spouse's right to sexual enjoyment may also occur in that
either sex may reject sexual behavior upon contracting genital
herpes.' 7 The disease, therefore, may result in periodic or permanent
impairment of sexual-marital functions. Additionally, an infected
party may suffer severe depression'" resulting in a loss to the spouse
of companionship, affection, society, and moral support.
Whether the degree of harm suffered by a plaintiff's spouse is
93. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
94. Id. at 400, 525 P.2d at 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
95. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (holding that the spouse of
a patient misdiagnosed as having a venereal disease could maintain an action against the diag-
nosing hospital when such a diagnosis resulted in a break down of his marriage).
96. See id. at 932-33, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841.




sufficiently severe so as to give rise to a cause of action for loss of
consortium is a matter of proof. Under the requisite facts and cir-
cumstances, however, a spouse should be able to maintain an action
for such loss in his own right.
E. Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Spouse's Right to Mental
and Emotional Tranquility
When a defendant has knowledge that a plaintiff is married
and, nevertheless, infects him with genital herpes, a cause of action
may arise in the non-infected spouse for the infliction of emotional
distress. The Molien court, finding that a physician could be held
liable for the erroneous diagnosis of syphilis, held that the defen-
dant's tortious conduct was directed to the spouse as well as to the
plaintiff. The California Supreme Court stated that it was predict-
able that an erroneous diagnosis of such a disease would produce
marital discord and emotional distress to the spouse. 9
One who transmits genital herpes to a married person may,
likewise, predict with relative certainty that transmission will result
in anxiety, suspicion, and hostility in the marital relationship. 1  As
genital herpes is normally transmitted through sexual relations, its
occurrence is a strong indication of marital infidelity. Such a revela-
tion may lead to a severe disruption, or even dissolution, of a mar-
riage resulting in foreseeable emotional distress to the innocent
spouse. Whether the defendant's conduct actually caused such dis-
tress depends upon the facts of each individual case. If the circum-
stances warrant, a spouse should be able to maintain a cause of ac-
tion for the infliction of emotional distress.
V. CONCLUSION
The novelty of a case should not operate to defeat recovery if
general tort principles are applicable. The common law has long rec-
ognized that an action lies against one who infects another with a
contagious or infectious disease. Although, initially, spousal immu-
nity, contributory negligence, and assumption of the risk operated to
preclude recovery in cases involving sexually transmitted disease,
these doctrines have been abrogated in California. In addition, the
99. 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
100. See Leo, supra note 1, at 63-64. The author of The New Scarlet Letter writes that
"[iln a monogamous relationship, the unsuspecting person who picks up herpes from a partner
is hit with a double whammy: evidence of betrayal and a lifelong disease as a mnomento of the
event." Id.
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sexual revolution of the sixties has provided a social climate more
conducive to the bringing of such actions.
The imposition of a duty to abstain from sexual relations when
one has a contagious outbreak of genital herpes is supported by both
common law and statutory principles. The Rowland court indicated
that an injured plaintiff should be allowed a remedy unless recovery
was clearly against public policy. The considerations enumerated in
Rowland strongly suggest that liability should be imposed upon a
defendant who transmits genital herpes. Section 3353 of the Health
and Safety Code, likewise, establishes a standard of due care to not
expose another to contagious disease. Furthermore, by finding a duty
to abstain from sexual conduct during periods of active outbreak, the
court will not only provide a remedy for injured citizens, but will
also curtail the rapid spread of genital herpes.
Whether a plaintiff brings suit in negligence, battery, or deceit
will depend upon the facts of the case. Whether there is a cause of
action for loss of consortium or infliction of emotional distress on the
part of a plaintiff's spouse is also dependent upon the circumstances.
Nevertheless, these causes of action should be recognized by the Cal-
ifornia courts, and the jury, as fact finder, should determine the mer-
its of each individual case. A plaintiff who contracts genital herpes
from a defendant should be allowed to seek a remedy for the perma-
nent injury which he has sustained, and society should be assured
that a defendant who threatens one's health and safety will be held
liable for the injury which he has caused.
Georgia Kloostra Van Zanten
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